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Testimony of
JEFF DRUMTRA
Africa Policy Analyst
U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES
on
U.S. RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS
IN RWANDA I CENTRAL AFRICA
before the
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
July 26, 1994

Introduction
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) to testify
today about the Rwanda crisis and its effects on East Central Africa. My name is Jeff Drumtra,
Africa Policy Analyst for the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Roger Winter, Director of USCR,
had to depart unexpectedly for Rwanda three days ago to participate, on behalf ofUSCR and
InterAction, in an emergency United Nations assessment mission. For that reason he is unable to
be here today.
USCR is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization that has monitored refugee situations
worldwide for 36 years. USCR staff have traveled to Rwanda almost annually in the past 10
years. We are currently in the process of making our seventh site visit to Rwanda in the past four
months to assess the situation there.
USCR staff traveled to Rwanda during March 29 to April 3, just prior to the April 6
outbreak of violence, and evaluated the conditions for repatriation of Rwandan refugees under the
Arusha peace accord. Our itinerary took us to the northern towns of Mulindi, Byumba, Murumba,
Nyagasigata, Cyumba, and Kivuye. A USCR staff consultant made two additional trips inside
Rwanda in April; the purpose of the third trip was to provide guidance and analysis for a CBS
News reporting team.
USCR conducted its fourth site visit to Rwanda during May 15 to May 19, traveling some
300 miles throughout the eastern half of the country. USCR staff investigated conditions in the
villages ofRwamagana, Kibungo, Zaza, Kanzenze, Nyamata, Rusomo, Musaza, Byumba,
Mulindi, and Muhura, and found appalling scenes of death at most locations. USCR conducted its
fifth assessment mission to Rwanda during June 19 to June 22 and reached the Rwandan capital of
Kigali as well as the villages of Gitarama, Mugina, Ruhango, Kanombe, Morambi, and Mulindi.
A USCR consultant is in the process of returning from a sixth site visit inside the Rwanda as well
as into Burundi, and we are awaiting those findings. USCR Director Roger Winter is, as
mentioned, currently in Rwanda on our seventh site visit and will also be in Goma, Zaire.
Drawing on information and analysis collected during these trips inside Rwanda, USCR
has provided regular public and private briefings for officials of the State Department, the National
Security Council, the Pentagon, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, other U.S. officials,
international relief organizations, the media, and the American public. USCR published a
description and analysis of the massacres in the Washington Post on June 5. USCR issued an
Action Alert on May 2 that contained 13 policy recommendations urging protection for Rwandan
civilians, accountability for the massacres, steps to diplomatically isolate Rwanda's self-proclaimed
government, and provision of urgent humanitarian assistance. USCR issued an updated Action
Alert on June 27 urging 19 policy steps to alleviate the Rwanda crisis.
We deeply appreciate the invitation to participate in this hearing today.
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Scope of Testimony
World attention is now riveted on 1.5 million or more Rwandan refugees and their
desperate battle to survive cholera and malnutrition in Zaire. Certainly this latest chapter in
Rwanda's humanitarian catastrophe, unfolding before our eyes on television screens, is an urgent
concern of this Subcommittee and of everyone in the hearing room today. The Subcommittee has
asked the U.S. Committee for Refugees to assess this unfolding refugee crisis along the ZaireRwanda border and offer our suggestions at this hearing.
In addition, the Subcommittee has asked USCR to address issues beyond the immediate
humanitarian emergency and to provide today a broader perspective--to look backward as well as
forward in our testimony. The Subcommittee has asked USCR to analyze the horrific events that
have occurred on the ground in Rwanda since April, and to evaluate the overall response of U.S.
policymakers to the past four months of crisis there. The Subcommittee has urged USCR to
highlight the lessons learned from this crisis so that the United States' diplomatic and humanitarian
relief arms might plan and respond more effectively when catastrophes occur in the future. You
have asked us to suggest how to make the American "response system" work better.

Summary
The straightforward title of today's hearing, "The Crisis in Rwanda," does not fully convey
the enormous issues at stake. This hearing is, in our view, the first systematic review of how the
United States--the world's only superpower and a country based on the principles of human rights-failed to respond appropriately to the clearest case of genocide the world has seen in 50 years.
At the core of our analysis is this: During the past four months, U.S. officials failed to
comprehend--or refused to acknowledge--that genocide was occurring in Rwanda until it was too
late. An aggressive response to thwart genocide should have been at the heart of U.S. policy since
early April, but was not. This massive failure--or refusal--to recognize genocide and to respond
appropriately is, in our view, a shameful moment in the annals of American foreign policy and
produced a flawed U.S. response to the crisis that was politically ineffectual and at times
counterproductive.
The sequence of U.S. policy mistakes is sobering:
• U.S. officials refused to invoke the Genocide Convention of 1948, which would have
provided a legal framework to take action against the mass murders in Rwanda. U.S. officials
compounded their egregious error by issuing dubious interpretations of the Genocide Convention
that, if allowed to stand, may leave it permanently eviscerated as a component of international law.
• The U.S. government played a lead role in the UN Security Council's tragic decision in April to
withdraw most UN troops from Rwanda rather than immediately increase UN troop strength to
protect innocent Rwandan civilians who were targeted for extermination.
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• U.S. officials almost single-handedly delayed a UN decision in May to send new peacekeeping
troops into Rwanda. Those new UN troops still have not arrived, more than two months later.
• U.S. policymakers refused repeated pleas from relief workers and human rights experts to shut
down the propaganda radio broadcasts of Rwanda's political extremists, even though the
vehement broadcasts were clearly playing a pivotal role in inciting and sustaining genocide and in
provoking a new humanitarian emergency by directing more than 1 million ethnic Hutu Rwandans
to flee into Zaire.
• U.S. officials supported a French military intervention that--given the Rwandan Patriotic
Front's deep suspicions of French intentions--virtually ensured the RPF would push for a total
military victory, resulting in huge refugee outflows into Zaire.
• The U.S. government continued to grant diplomatic recognition to Rwanda's self-declared
"interim government" during its entire campaign of genocide. American officials belatedly
withdrew diplomatic recognition only after the regime was effectively in exile, more than three
months after its pogrom began. This delay by U.S. officials sent the wrong message to extremists
in Rwanda and to repressive regimes elsewhere in the world, for that matter.
• The Administration's failure to acknowledge in a forthright manner that genocide--the ultimate
crime against humanity--was occurring in Rwanda hindered efforts to mobilize public support
for a well-funded humanitarian response by private relief agencies.
Despite serious errors of judgment and a disappointing lack of will in the Administration's
response to the Rwanda crisis during the past four months, it is not too late for U.S. policymakers
to achieve two objectives publicly declared by the State Department: "to speed delivery of
humanitarian assistance, and to investigate the origins of the killings and seek accountability."
Although the President should have acted sooner, we commend his announcement last Friday that
up to 4,000 U.S. military personnel will be engaged in a massive effort to provide humanitarian
assistance to 1.5 million Rwandan refugees in Zaire. The U.S. military is the only institution in the
world possessing the logistical capacity to address the urgent needs of these refugees.
USCR recommends that the President should take several additional steps at this time:
1 • Grant diplomatic recognition to Rwanda's new coalition government as a first step in
normalizing political and humanitarian conditions inside the country. U.S. officials can use this
opportunity to communicate to Rwanda's new leaders the need for responsible government.
2 • Channel more relief and development assistance into Rwanda in order to foster better
conditions for refugee repatriation and nation-building. Use Kigali, the Rwandan capital, rather
than Entebbe, Uganda as the main staging site for relief operations.
3 • Insist that Zairean authorities keep their border open so that refugees can repatriate when they
want to do so.
4 • Allow U.S. soldiers to deploy on the Rwanda side of the border so that refugees in Zaire,
aware of the troops' presence, can more easily repatriate with a sense of safety. This would ease
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the overwhelming strain on relief efforts at refugee sites in Zaire.
5 • Help a multinational UN peacekeeping force deploy in Rwanda as soon as possible to
improve security and build confidence among refugees wishing to repatriate.
6 • Ensure that the defeated regime's extremist radio broadcasts in refugee camps are shut
down permanently. Silencing the broadcasts is crucial to change the psychology of the refugees
and to begin exposing them to accurate information.
7 • Help the new government of Rwanda install a new radio station enabling it to speak directly
to the Rwandan people.
8 • Enforce strict disarmament of Rwandan soldiers and militias who fled to Zaire, Burundi,
and Tanzania. Make clear to Zairean authorities in particular that attacks on Rwanda from Zaire's
territory will not be tolerated.
9 • Empower U.S., UN, and French troops to detain officials of the deposed government and
other prominent leaders in the massacres.
10 • Make documentation of Rwanda's genocide an urgent priority. Rapidly provide full
diplomatic, financial, and logistical support to these efforts. Investigation and documentation are
necessary to bring perpetrators to justice in a court of law, begin the difficult process of healing
Rwandan society, and demonstrate worldwide that massive human rights violations cannot be
perpetrated with impunity.
11 • Impress on Burundian authorities the importance of taking action to shut down the private,
extremist radio broadcasts in Burundi that threaten to incite additional violence there.
Mr. Chairman, the main text of this testimony elaborates on these important points and
includes--per your request--a thorough analysis of the overall U.S. response to the Rwanda crisis
during the past four months and a full discussion of USCR's policy recommendations to address
immediate and future needs.
This written testimony also contains an Appendix providing a chronology of events during
the past four months that the Subcommittee and members of the public will find useful. A close
reading of the chronology documents week after week of inaction and dissembling by the U.S. and
by other governments while Rwandan government officials openly conducted their extermination
campaign against an entire ethnic group and all political opponents. Our testimony also includes
copies of two op-ed pieces by USCR describing and analyzing events in Rwanda as they unfolded.
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The Core U.S. Failure: No Response to Genocide
Even by its own measurements, the Administration's diplomatic strategy for dealing with
the crisis in Rwanda has failed to this point.
The State Department publicly declared as early as April that it was establishing five policy
objectives in Rwanda. Although one objective was "to stop the killings," the massive slaughter
continued without restraint, leaving a half-million or more persons dead. Although a second State
Department goal was to "bring ... a ceasefire, no significant ceasefire occurred. Although a third
declared U.S. policy goal was to "urge a resumption of negotiations," meaningful negotiations did
not occur.
II

The fourth U.S. policy objective, "to speed delivery of humanitarian assistance," has been
only a partial success. U.S. officials responded rapidly to the plight of 300,000 Rwandan refugees
in Tanzania in early May, but the Administration has drawn criticism recently for waiting several
crucial days before mounting an all-out response to the plight of 1.5 million cholera-plagued
Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Some 10,000 persons have reportedly perished in the Zaire refugee
camps. Furthermore, the U.S. has been slow to mount a relief effort for some 500,000 displaced
persons inside Rwandan Patriotic Front-controlled areas of Rwanda during the past 16 weeks,
reportedly because of political constraints imposed by the State Department on its own
humanitarian relief officials.
The fifth policy goal declared months ago by the State Department was "to investigate the
origins of the killings and seek accountability. There is still time to achieve this important goal.
The U.S. has announced its support for some form of international tribunal to bring the
masterminds of the massacres to justice. American officials will have to act aggressively to push
this process forward.
II

Given the Administration's failure to achieve the majority of its stated goals in Rwanda,
several questions arise: Why did U.S. policy fail? What was wrong with U.S. diplomatic
strategy? Exactly what lessons are we supposed to learn from this nightmare? Indeed, could
anything have been done to save lives inside Rwanda?
Mr. Chairman, the core failing of U.S. policymakers from the beginning was that they
failed either to comprehend or acknowledge that genocide--in the strictest legal and moral sense of
the term--was occurring in Rwanda. U.S. officials refused to recognize or admit that powerful
individuals and organizations in Rwanda--the ruling party, its extremist militias, and the
government military--were engaging in a campaign of highly organized mass murder against all
ethnic Tutsi, as well as against moderate Hutu officials, which qualified as genocide under
international law.
This failure of U.S. officials to label the existence of genocide had serious policy
repercussions. A string of flawed policies flowed from this fundamental--and in our view,
shameful--lack of will:
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• Because U.S. officials refused to frame events in Rwanda in the context of genocide, the
United States failed to invoke the 1948 Genocide Convention, which obliges nations to stop
genocide when and where it occurs.
By refusing even to say the word "genocide" until too late, U.S. officials failed to mobilize
the response needed to deter the ultimate crime against humanity. The crime of genocide that the
U.S. had solemnly pledged would happen "never again" anywhere in the world was allowed to run
its course in Rwanda during April, May, and June. At least 500,000 persons, mostly Tutsi, were
murdered for no reason other than their ethnic identity. They were regarded by Rwanda's thenruling regime as political opponents to be exterminated.
"Genocide" is a word that carries great legal and moral weight. The United States is a
signatory to the 1948 Genocide Convention, which outlaws genocide as a crime against humanity
and obliges signatories to take action to stop genocide and/or protect its targeted victims. The
Convention defines genocide as "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial, or religious group." Rwanda's regime and its extremist supporters were
clearly engaged in systematic killings intended to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group. The UN
Commission for Human Rights issued a report on June 28 stating that "the conditions laid down
by the 1948 Convention are thus met.. .. The term 'genocide' should henceforth be used as regards
the [killing of] Tutsi" in Rwanda.
U.S. officials dodged legal responsibility by refusing to acknowledge that genocide was in
fact occurring. News reports in early June indicated that the Administration forbade its officials
from uttering the word "genocide" in order to avoid legal obligation to respond to the killings. Not
until mid-June--after most of the massacres had taken place--did Secretary of State Warren
Christopher grudgingly label events in Rwanda as "genocide," although he added that he
wondered "if there is any particular magic in calling it genocide."
The State Department compounded the ill effects of this half-hearted policy by declaring in
June that the Genocide Convention merely "enables" the world to respond but does not require a
response. If this flawed interpretation of the law, forwarded by U.S. officials to justify their
inaction, is allowed to stand, it may irreparably damage--if not eviscerate--the Genocide
Convention's stature as a powerful prohibition against the calculated extermination of entire ethnic
groups.

• The United States played a lead role in the UN Security Council's tragic decision in April
to withdraw 2,000 UN troops from Rwanda, rather than strengthen UN troop presence in
order to protect innocent Rwandan civilians targeted for extermination.
Confronted with massive massacres that began on April 6 and continued night and day
without interruption, U.S. and UN officials could have offered the victims protection and reduced
the scale of slaughter by strengthening the contingent of 2,500 UN peacekeepers already in
Rwanda. Instead, the United States led the UN decision on April 21 to withdraw all but several
hundred UN troops, leaving Rwanda's Tutsi population and moderate Hutu leaders to almost
certain death. The shocking pullout of UN troops had the effect of giving a green light to the
regime's campaign of genocide and gave the attackers every reason to believe they could proceed
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with impunity.
With the exception of 10 Belgian soldiers killed in the first hours of violence, indications
suggest that UN troops were not usually· targeted for attack during the ~h~~e months o~~~restrained
genocide. Bear in mind that most of the killings were perpetrated by CIVIlian youth nuhtias who
were intimidated when confronted by armed force. In fact, the 450 UN troops that remained in
Kigali after April effectively protected up to 20,000 civilians from certain death at various sites
around Kigali--a ratio of 40 civilians saved per each UN soldier on the ground. At just one
location, Hotel Milles Collines, a mere 10 to 12 UN soldiers protected some 600 Tutsi who were
under siege for two months--a "save" ratio of at least 50 civilians per soldier. These examples of
lifesaving work by a mere 450 UN soldiers suggest that if the U.S. and UN had taken prompt
action to double the UN contingent to 5,000 troops--rather than withdrawing 2,000 soldiers--a
quarter-million lives might well have been saved. The world could have made a huge dent in the
Rwandan regime's campaign of genocide.

• U.S. officials slowed efforts to insert new UN peacekeeping troops into Rwanda, allowing
the massacres to run their course. Administration officials exhibited no sense of urgency
and hindered the UN' s efforts to act with dispatch.
Some members of the UN Security Council quickly realized that the April 21 decision to
withdraw 2,000 troops was a tragic mistake and attempted in May to authorize the deployment of a
larger UN force of up to 5,500 troops to protect trapped civilians. The United States delayed the
authorization and deployment process for weeks, insisting on further study. The delay effectively
granted a grace period for additional massacres inside Rwanda. Although numerous countries
have offered to send a combined 4,000 peacekeeping troops, the troops have not arrived in
Rwanda and require financial and logistical assistance from the U.S. and other powers before they
can deploy.
The U.S. military is currently demonstrating in Zaire that it has the logistical ability to
deploy massive numbers of troops quickly, and could have done so in April to key locations inside
Rwanda where lives could have been saved. Although Rwanda as a country does not hold
strategic value for the United States, the United States does have a strategic, legal, and moral
interest in deterring genocide. The United States' failure to respond stemmed from a lack of will,
not a lack of capability. The nearly 70,000 UN peacekeeping soldiers currently deployed at UN
peacekeeping operations worldwide include about 800 American troops--a mere 1 percent of the
UN's total force.

• By failing to acknowledge that events in Rwanda constituted genocide to be thwarted at
all costs, U.S. officials refused to shut down or "jam" extremist radio broadcasts that
played a pivotal role in inciting and sustaining the genocide. State Department officials
cited legal technicalities for their inaction. The broadcasts were allowed to emanate from
the regime and its supporters throughout the crisis, exhorting the population to massacre
Tutsi and, in July, ordering more than 1 million Hutu to flee to Zaire, provoking the
current humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions.
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State Department officials on several occasions expressed to USCR that they were
studying the possibility of jamming Radio Milles Collines and the government radio station in
Rwanda--they were aware of the insidious propaganda power of the broadcasts--but they
ultimately said that various legal and technical difficulties precluded taking action.
In USCR's view, taking action to stop genocide--the ultimate crime against humanity-should override such legal inhibitions. Moreover, numerous military personnel and radio
technicians have indicated to USCR that jamming radio stations--especially those with weak
signals--is not technically difficult. U.S. officials on one occasion said they were prevented from
jamming the broadcasts because they were unable to locate the frequency. USCR responded by
informing the State Department that the broadcasts were airing on 94.1 FM. The Administration
took no action.
Administration officials indicated last week that either the United States or France would
finally take action to silence the regime's clandestine radio station broadcasting into the refugee
camps in Zaire. USCR urges that the broadcast be shut down permanently.

• By spending weeks trying to initiate negotiations linking an end to the massacres with a
ceasefire, U.S. officials exhibited a misunderstanding of what was driving the massacres
and what might end them.
The massacres began on April 6, several days before the civil war resumed. The
massacres were committed throughout Rwanda, in hundreds of locations far from the threat of
war, distant from the front lines. The civil war did not drive the massacres, which were motivated
by a determination to eliminate all potential political opposition. There was absolutely no reason to
believe a ceasefire in the civil war would curb the slaughter going on separately. In fact, by linking
the two issues in negotiations, U.S. officials inadvertently gave the regime a convenient "excuse"
to continue the massacres in the absence of a ceasefire. This misguided U.S. strategy was
particularly hollow given the absence of any other meaningful U.S. effort to stop the massacres.

• By refusing to break diplomatic relations with Rwanda's murderous government until
July 15--three long months after its campaign of genocide began--the Administration lent
Rwanda's extremists an air of legitimacy, gave them hopes of impunity, and hampered
humanitarian relief inside the country.
The United States should have rapidly broken relations as a concrete signal to all Rwandans
that their government had lost legitimacy and that its frenzied slaughter of an ethnic group was
transforming their country into a pariah state in the eyes of the world community. Administration
officials belatedly withdrew diplomatic recognition only after the Rwandan regime was effectively
in exile. This delay sent the wrong message to extremists in Rwanda and to repressive regimes
elsewhere in the world.
Diplomatic recognition of Rwanda's self-proclaimed government throughout April, May,
and June also made relief efforts in RPF-controlled territory politically difficult for many private
and governmental relief agencies despite great humanitarian needs there. The U.S. Office of
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Foreign Disaster Assistance, a federal agency staffed with excellent relief experts, was reportedly
barred by Administration policy from conducting an official needs assessment in RPF-territory
until the past two weeks, despite the fact that some 500,000 internally displaced persons and some
1.5 million other civilians were reportedly located there. Many private relief groups routinely
hesitate to operate without the permission of a host country's recognized government, in order to
avoid appearances of political favoritism. State Department officials should have made clear long
ago that Rwanda's government had forfeited its legitimacy.

• By supporting French military intervention instead of rapid deployment of multinational
UN troops, the Administration inadvertently ensured that the RPF --given its deep
suspicions of French intentions--would push for a complete military victory, resulting in
huge refugee flows into Zaire.
The RPF indicated in June that it might halt its military offensive under certain
circumstances, including the arrest and detention of Rwanda's rump government and other
massacre leaders. There is no way to know if the RPF would in fact have halted its attack. What
is certain is that the entry of French troops into Rwanda in late June raised understandable
suspicions worldwide, given France's history of military and political support for Rwanda's
hardline government. The RPF predictably decided--correctly or not--that French troops intended
to bolster a crippled government and that the only way to ensure complete defeat of the
government was to capture its traditional stronghold in northwest Rwanda. The ensuing military
offensive, combined with the regime's radio broadcasts instructing people to flee, produced an
unprecedented flow of more than 1 million new refugees in less than a week's time.

• By failing to acknowledge in a forthright manner that genocide--the ultimate crime
against humanity--was occurring in Rwanda, the Administration did not properly educate
the American public about what was happening. This hindered efforts to mobilize public
support for a well-funded humanitarian response by private relief agencies.
Average Americans' unfortunate stereotypes about tribal African wars masked the reality
of what was happening in Rwanda and immobilized the public's response. Public financial
contributions to Rwandan relief efforts were meager through June, according to InterAction, the
umbrella agency for American relief organizations. The Administration did not communicate the
stark, one-sided nature of the killings, or that events in Rwanda represented one of history's
greatest crimes. The Administration did not elevate this crisis to priority status, and thus neither
did the public.
,
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Current Emergency: A Solution-Oriented Strategy
The current Rwandan refugee crisis in Zaire is unprecedented. It is the largest, fastest
refugee flight in history. During July 13 to July 19, an estimated 1.5 million Rwandan refugees
entered Zaire. One official of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees called it "the
exodus of a nation." Although many of the refugees--all of them ethnic Hum--legitimately feared
for their safety as the front line of the civil war approached, it appears that what would have been a
large population of refugees was whipped into a staggeringly huge refugee exodus by the
vehement radio broadcasts of Rwanda's retreating rump government, which directed all civilians to
flee with their government officials.
UN and nongovernmental relief agencies, working on their own, could not possibly have
prepared for this deluge even under the best conditions. Stretched beyond capacity by nearly
500,000 Rwandan refugees in Tanzania and Burundi and by emergencies in other parts of the
world, relief officials were in no position to cope with 1.5 million additional refugees in a difficult
location in Zaire. Relief agencies pleaded for high-level assistance from the United States and
other major nations. Mter an outbreak of cholera killed several thousand refugees and with intense
media coverage of their unspeakable misery, President Clinton announced on July 22 that the U.S.
military would launch a humanitarian operation into Zaire. A White House team is now
reportedly coordinating the relief effort. The U.S. military is the only institution in the world that
possesses the logistical capability to undertake such a massive relief operation rapidly, and USCR
commends the President's decision to mount an all-out effort. Saving the lives of refugees in Zaire
must be a priority.
The ultimate solution for the predicament of most of the refugees, however, will be
voluntary repatriation to Rwanda when the situation there allows. Adequate assistance to such a
huge dependent population in Zaire cannot be sustained for an extended period. The U.S.
government should act now to pursue a solution-oriented strategy by taking steps that will quickly
lay the groundwork for voluntary refugee repatriation to Rwanda. At a time when the international
community is struggling to feed refugees in Zaire by shipping 600 tons of food each day, some
areas of Rwanda have crops in the ground awaiting harvest when people return. A wise strategy
would provide services in home areas of Rwanda, particularly where food is already available.
Despite the Administration's serious failings throughout the Rwanda crisis, it has an
opportunity to play a constructive role in coming days and weeks.

• First, the U.S. government should grant official diplomatic recognition to the new
coalition government of Rwanda announced last week. Diplomatic recognition is a critical
first step in normalizing political and humanitarian conditions in the country.
Expeditious recognition of Rwanda's new government would help Rwanda begin its long
healing process. It would also facilitate international relief efforts inside the country that may
ultimately give many Rwandan refugees confidence to return home voluntarily. American relief
agencies will be able to cooperate with the new government more easily if the U.S. normalizes
diplomatic relations.
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Rwanda's coalition government reportedly includes at least 12 Hutu and 6 Tutsi among the
19 cabinet positions announced so far. Information about the ethnicity of one cabinet official is
currently unavailable. The RPF holds 9 of the 19 announced seats in the new government. Three
political parties other than the RPF hold 10 of the 19 cabinet positions.

• Second, channel more relief and development assistance into Rwanda in order to foster
better conditions for refugee repatriation and nation-building. Provide technical assistance
to the new government.
The nearly 2 million Rwandan refugees in the region, as well as the estimated 2 million
internally displaced persons inside Rwanda, will be more inclined to return home when they see
relief operations and an international presence in their country. The new Rwandan government
lacks experience in relief administration and has no civil affairs capacity. It requires rapid training.
UN agencies should relocate their operational headquarters for this crisis from Nairobi to
Kigali, and Kigali airport should be the focus of the U.S. effort to build up humanitarian relief in
the region. The airport is in decent condition and could be improved within 24 hours with the right
equipment. Truck transport costs from Kigali to Goma, Zaire are cheaper than from Entebbe,
Uganda to Goma. Convoys traveling between Kigali and Goma could deliver badly needed
supplies to Rwandan communities along the route. USCR staff currently on the ground in the
region state that this recommendation has wide support among relief professionals there.

• Third, insist that Zairean authorities keep their border open so that refugees can
repatriate when they want to do so.
Zairean soldiers have blocked some groups of refugees from repatriating in recent days.
Although the border was open again on Monday, the Administration and the UN should closely
monitor against future border closings and should register strong protests when they occur.

• Fourth, the Administration should allow U.S. soldiers to deploy at some sites on the
Rwanda side of the border as well as in Zaire. Deployment of troops into safe areas in
northwest Rwanda will enable refugees in Zaire to repatriate with a greater sense of safety.
Although the deployment of U.S. troops in the refugee camps in Zaire is commendable,
immediately positioning some U.S. soldiers in northwestern Rwanda could facilitate refugees'
voluntary return home. The region is quiet--it is no longer a war zone. Carefully positioning
troops on the Rwandan side of the border would contribute to a more lasting solution to the current
humanitarian crisis.

• Fifth, deploy an expanded multinational UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda within
weeks in order to improve security and build confidence among refugees wishing to
repatriate.
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French troops will begin departing in a few days and should not be asked to remain beyond
their August 22 target date for complete withdrawal. The prolonged presence of French troops
would send the wrong signals to Rwandan society. In order to speed the deployment of UN
troops, the French should leave their equipment behind for use by an expanded UN force.

• Sixth, ensure that the defeated regime's radio broadcasts are shut down permanently in
Rwanda and in refugee camps in Zaire.
The same regime that orchestrated the murder of a half-million Tutsi also helped direct the
massive population flight two weeks ago which has left some 10,000 Hutu refugees dead of
cholera and an additional2,000 to 3,000 dying each day. Its vehement radio broadcasts, which
continued to air in the Zaire refugee camps last week, have heightened Rwandan Hutus' fear of the
RPF. Although the RPF has been guilty of some atrocities, by all independent accounts it has not
exhibited a policy of retribution against most Hutus. Silencing the radio broadcasts is crucial to
change the psychology of the refugees and begin exposing them to accurate information.

• Seventh, help the new government of Rwanda install its own radio station so that it can
speak directly to the Rwandan people.
Rwandans should be given an opportunity to hear what their new govetnment wants to tell
them. Installation of a new radio station will require financial assistance as well as legal assistance
to conform with international broadcasting regulations.

• Eighth, enforce strict disarmament of Rwandan soldiers and militias who fled to Zaire,
Tanzania, and Burundi. Make clear to Zairean authorities that attacks on Rwanda from
Zaire's territory will not be tolerated.
Reports have surfaced that the deposed regime's soldiers and militias are attempting to rearm to launch a guerrilla campaign against the new government of Rwanda. U.S. and French
troops should ensure that complete disarmament has occurred. Zairean troops are known for their
corruption and cannot be trusted to enforce the disarmament.

• Ninth, mandate U.S., UN, and French troops to detain officials of the deposed
government and other prominent leaders in the massacres.
Reasonable cause exists for the arrest of scores of massacre leaders while full investigation
and documentation of the genocide continues. The arrest of individuals widely known to be guilty
would improve security in border regions and would signal to Rwandans that the time has come to
follow new, hopefully more moderate, leaders.

• Tenth, place an urgent priority on documentation of Rwanda's genocide. This is needed
to bring guilty individuals to justice and to send a warning that such acts are punished by
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the world community.
The Administration has indicated support for a special tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators
of genocide in Rwanda. U.S. officials should push this process by providing immediate
diplomatic, financial, and logistical support to human rights investigators.

• Impress on Burundian authorities the importance of taking action to shut down the
private, extremist radio broadcasts in Burundi that threaten to incite additional violence
there.
Burundi is struggling through its own political transition and is attempting to recover from
politically instigated violence that killed some 50,000 persons in late 1993. Events in Rwanda
have heightened tensions in Burundi, and recent private radio broadcasts transmitting a message of
hate could sow the seeds of more bloodshed.

Lessons for the Future
Mr. Chairman, you have expressed a keen interest in focusing this hearing on how to make
the U.S. political and humanitarian relief systems respond more ef~ectively to catastrophes such as
Rwanda. It is a valuable line of inquiry, and we commend you for raising the issue in this way.
The core lesson of Rwanda, in our view, is that our response system did not fail us, but
rather we as a nation failed our response system. The U.S. political response to the Rwanda crisis
failed because U.S. officials lacked the will to respond. Several weeks ago a White House
spokesman implied that a better "socioeconomic and political early warning system" might have
improved U.S. policy before and during the Rwanda crisis. In fact, early warning of a calamity in
Rwanda existed. No one quite foresaw its massive scale, but Rwanda's peace process and human
rights standards were clearly in dangerous trouble long before the massacres occurred. In fact,
politically instigated ethnic violence in neighboring Burundi six months earlier, in October 1993,
gave ample warning that the densely populated region of East Central Africa had reached a new
explosive stage, and that ruling parties and military leaders accustomed to unquestioned power
were determined to resist democratic reforms and coalition governments.
It is also clear that the U.S. has the capacity to respond rapidly and massively to
emergencies when it chooses to do so. The current U.S. humanitarian military mission to Zaire is
the latest proof of that, and stands in stark contrast to the American government's tortuously slow
response to UN peacekeepers logistical needs throughout the crisis.

Mr. Chairman, allow me to suggest four ways to improve the U.S. response system based
on the Rwanda example.
First, make better use of existing international laws which can provide a framework--a
rallying point--for urgent action in crisis situations. We are a nation of laws, and the American
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public is more likely to respond positively to issues framed in that context. U.S. officials refused
to use the Genocide Convention in this crisis and may have damaged the Convention in the
process. Congress, the Administration, and all international signatories to the Convention as well
as to other international human rights instruments must be held to the letter and the spirit of the
covenants they have signed. They must live up to what these covenants empower or oblige the
international community to do when confronted with an emergency requiring action. Secretary of
State Christopher appeared to denigrate the importance of the Genocide Convention in June when
he questioned whether the word genocide has any particular magic. The "magic" comes from
people of courage taking action on the treaties they have signed.
II

II

Secondly, the United States can respond more effectively to political crises by preventing
them in the first place. In particular, U.S. officials should participate more aggressively in
ensuring that political leaders and opposition groups adhere to the peace processes and political
reforms they signed--such as the Arusha accords in Rwanda. If the Arusha accords had been
implemented on schedule, the Rwandan army chain of command would have been changed and
many soldiers would have been demobilized by April. The United States and the international
community tolerated delays in Arusha that opened the possibility for the orchestrated violence that
ultimately occurred.
Thirdly, the U.S. humanitarian response system works best when the talented relief
professionals of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are able to do their vital humanitarian
work without political constraints from the State Department. Political constraints against working
in RPF-controlled territory hampered OFDA activities in much of Rwanda until recently. The
agency's mission is purely humanitarian, and it should be allowed to operate that way.
Fourthly, the U.S. humanitarian response system requires adequate funding to respond
most effectively. The displacement of some 4 million Rwandans inside and outside their country
and the need to provide assistance to them in difficult locations has overwhelmed the capacity of
governmental and nongovernmental relief agencies. Relief budgets are virtually exhausted. A
supplemental appropriation will be necessary this year, and should receive the support of this
Subcommittee and all members of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes our testimony. On behalf ofUSCR, thank you for inviting
us to share our views and analysis with you today.
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Policy Recommendations here on out
- list and elaborate
Systemic Solutions Future Crises
- one word testimony= "will"
- this rapid gear-up airlift indicts slow response to this point
-don't fall for the "early warning" trap I quote Clinton at White House Conference

Timeline of Events/Chronology
Two USCR Op-Eds
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It is not too late, however, for the United States to fulfill another of its stated objectives: to
provide humanitarian relief. Although shocking numbers of Rwandan refugees have perished in
Zaire, a million persons can be saved with humanitarian prompt action. (discuss recognition/relief
in country so people can return, etc. Solution oriented strategy)
U.S. policies should have flowed from a recognition that genocide was occurring in Rwanda--the
type of genocide that the U.S. had pledged would happen never again. Instead, the U.S. failed to
recognize--or refused to acknowledge--that genocide was occurring, and the policies that flowed
from that mistake were ineffectual at best and counterproductive at worst.
That explains why U.S. officials failed to achieve most of the policy goals they set for
themselves in the Rwanda crisis. The State Department stated publicly that three of its prime
policy objectives were to "stop the killings," to "bring a ceasefire," and to "negotiations."
(use
State Dept. policy objective quotes) None of those happened.
Members of Congress and other policymakers have repeatedly said in recent months that the scope
and motive for the massacres in Rwanda, in which a half-million or more persons were killed, are
incomprehensible to Americans' minds. On the contrary, what happened in Rwanda can be
comprehended by anyone who looks clearly at the situation.

The core failing of U.S. policymakers, from the very beginning, was that they failed to recognize
or acknowledge that genocide--in the strictest legal and moral sense of the term--was occurring in
Rwanda. U.S. officials refused to recognize or admit that the most powerful individuals and
groups in Rwanda--the ruling party, its extremist supporters and militias, and the government
military--were engaging in a campaign of highly organized mass murder.
Any attempt to understand--to comprehend--the staggering events of the past three months must
begin with this understanding: planned, systematic genocide was occurring in Rwanda. All
American policy decisions should have flowed from this fundamental fact. U.S. policy makers
dodged this fact. For two critical months they studiously avoided acknowldedging that genocide
was occurring. Therefore proper U.S. policies were not formulated. In fact, diplomatic efforts
were ineffectual at best and counterproductive at worst. Because U.S. policymak.ers did not face
the facts, the result was shame upon this country, impinged on our humanitratian response ....
In our view, U.S. policies should have flowed from an official determination that genocide was
occurring in Rwanda--the type of genocide that the U.S. had pledged would happen never again.
With an official acknowledgment that genocide was occurring,.
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Brief Chronology of Rwanda Crisis
April 1994 to Present
April 5:

UN Security Council Resolution 909 extends mandate of UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) until July 29 1994. The resolution authorizes UNAMIR to monitor the execution
of the Arusha peace accord between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF), Some 2,500 UNAMIR troops from 23 countries are present.

April 6:

Plane carrying Rwandan President Juvenal Habyrimana and Burundian President Cyprien
Ntaryamira crashes on approach to Kigali airport. Rwandan Defense Ministry states plane
shot down by "unidentified elements."

April 7:

UPI reports .. fierce fighting" in and around Kigali.
Ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, attempting to protect Prime Minister Agathe Uwilinginyimana,
are tortured and executed by Rwandan soldiers of the Presidential Guard. The Prime
Minister is also murdered.
UN spokesman reports that many of those killed are leaders of four political parties
opposed to Habyrimana•s MRND.
UPI quotes President Clinton as saying "I am ... horrified that elements of the Rwandan
security forces have sought out and murdered Rwandan officials.....
Washington Post quotes recent radio broadcast warning Tutsis in Rwanda: ..You cockroaches
must know you are made of flesh! We won•t let you kill! We will kill you!"

April

a:

UPI reports that Presidential Guard .. was rampaging through the city [Kigali] detaining and
executing anyone suspected of being a member of the Tutsi minority."
Washington Post cites persistent reports, from witnesses and diplomats in Kigali, that
government ministers were being rounded up by soldiers and some had been executed."
II

UN Security Council President reports that an .. interim governmene has formed in Rwanda.
UPI quotes President Clinton as saying, "We•re doing everything we possibly can to be on
top of the situation there:'
April9:

French paratroopers arrive in Kigali to oversee evacuation of French nationals. Two
companies of U.S. marines are dispatched to Bujumbura, Burundi to prepare for the
evacuation of some 250 Americans m Rwanda.
UN Under Secretary General for peacekeeping expresses concern for safety of UNAMIR
forces, saying, "There are worrying signs as of Saturday, because the troops of the RPF are
moving toward Kigali."

April 1O:

Belgian paratroopers arrive in Kigali to oversee evacuation of Belgian nationals.
Most U.S. citizens evacuated by road convoy to Burundi.
U.S. Embassy in Kigali closes.

April 12:

U PI estimates at Ieast 1o, 000 people have been killed in the past six days.
Belgium informs the UN that it intends to withdraw its 400-strong UNAMIR contingent.

April 13:

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali outlines options on the future of UNAMIR to
the Security Council. Council decides not to withdraw UNAMIR completely but reaches no
final decision.
'
AP reports more than 100,000 persons have fled Kigali, and 20,000 have been killed.

April14:

AP reports on the arrival of con_voy of Belgian troops to evacuate 18 foreigner~: :·As the
convoy arrived 500 ethnic Tuts1 refugees camped 1n one of the compound's bUJid~ngs rushed
out with their hands up, plead~ng for. help. But they were all left _behind .... The [compound]
had been besieged since Tuesday mght by Hutu gangs armed wtth clubs, machetes, and
rifleS. 11
U.S. State Department Spokesman Michael McCurry says the Clinton Administration
condemns 11the slaughter of innocent civilians."
UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) created in Nairobi.

April15:

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) says at least 20,000
Rwandans have fled to neighboring countries.

April16:

After discussion, UN Security Council again defers decision on fate of UNAMIR.

April17:

At least 12,000 Rwandans, mostly Tutsis, have gathered at sites guarded by UNAMIR,
including the national stadium, the King Faisal Hospital, and the Meridian Hotel.

April18:

AP reports ~~massacres have spread throughout Rwanda:• International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) reports at least 400,000 Rwandans have been driven from their homes
and "tens and tens of thousands11 are dead. "The situation is catastrophic, not just in Kigali,
but in the rest of Rwanda," says an ICRC spokesman.

April19:

Christian Science Monitor quotes Canadian UNAMIR commander General Romeo Dallaire as
saying the killers are "like demons in human form," and notes radio broadcasts continue to
incite killing of Tutsis.

Human Rights Watch says the death toll has risen to 100,000.
April 20:

OXFAM releases statement saying the UN force "is not strong enough to protect civilians
and does not have a clear mandate to do so." OXFAM appeals to the UN Security Council
to "increase the size of the UN force."
AP reports 428 Belgian, 213 Bangladeshi, 144 Ghanaian, and 50 other UNAMIR soldiers
have evacuated from Rwanda over the past two days.
UNHCR reports more than 50,000 people have fled Rwanda.

April 21:

Security Council Resolution 912 reduces UNAMIR's authorized strength to 270 troops and
changes mandate to act as intermediary between forces and assist in aid delivery, but does
not authorize UNAMIR to stop killings of civilians.
AP reports two million people have fled their homes.
U.S. State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs attributes assassinations and "largescale massacre[s]" to Presidential Guard.

April 22:

National Security Advisor Lake calls on leaders of Rwandan military "to do everything in their
power to end the violence immediately:•
Some 1,000 UNAMIR troops prepare to leave Rwanda following adoption of Security
Council Resolution 912.
UNHCR reports more than 1oo,ooo people have fled Rwanda.

April 25:

AP quotes UN spokesman in Kigali as saying, ~~Radio RTLM [Radio-Television des Milles
Collines] is calling on militias to step up the killing of civilians."

April 27:

UNHCR reports more than 130,000 people have fled Rwanda.

April 28:

U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson declares 11 State of disaster. II

Aprif29:

UNHCR reports some 250,000 Rwandans have fled to Tanzania over the past 24 hours, the
largest and fastest exodus ever witnessed by the agency.
Boutros-Ghali tells Security Council that death toll may have reached 200,000. Boutros-Ghali
cites "strong evidence of preparations for further massacres of civilians," and calls for an
increase in UN presence that "would require a commitment of human and material resources
on a scale which member states have so far proved reluctant to contemplate."

April 30:

UN Security Council condemns massacres, but refuses to back Boutros-Ghali's call to
increase UN presence.
President Clinton calls on the Rwandan army and the RPF "to agree to an immediate ceasefire and return to negotiations aimed at a lasting peace in their country."

May 1:

UNHCR official reports "hundreds of bodies a day" floating down the Kagera River, which
empties into Lake Victoria. Many of the bodies have their hands tied behind their backs.

May2:

New York Times reports Boutros-Ghali is requesting African heads of state to contribute
troops to an all-African peacekeeping force for Rwanda.

May3:

Boutros-Ghali repeats call for African troops that would be financed and equipped by the
West, saying a foreign military presence is necessary to "defuse the conflict, to contain the
genocide." Fewer than 500 UN troops remain in Rwanda.

May4:

OXFAM reports that death toll may be 500,000.
Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, speaking at House Africa Subcommittee
hearing, says U.S. has declared "our intention to provide our fair share of support-logistical,
financial, and other-to such a [UN/OAU peacekeeping] mission, should it be mounted."

May 5:

In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs John
Shattuck says, "[T]he parties must begin serious and meaningful direct talks."

May 6:

Two-person USAID/BHR/OFDA team begins assessments of refugee sites in Uganda,
Burundi, and Tanzania

May 10:

UN staff circulate recommendation that calls for an international force of 5,500 peacekeeping
troops.
In South Africa, Vice President AI Gore says the United States has advanced .. several new
ideasu on Rwanda, which he says are not .. earthshaking," but declines to provide specifics,
saying, 11the discussion is unfortunately at a delicate stage. 11

May 11:

Boutros-Ghali reports Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania have offered to provide troops, and
says a force is necessary to 11 Stop the genocide taking place.''

New York Times reports the United States opposes a UN Security Council resolution to
send 5,500 UN troops to Rwanda, preferring the possibility of establishing a "protection
zone.. along parts of Rwanda's border. The United States advocates 11 far smaller numbers
[of UN troops] restricted to helping refugees in border areas, 11 Reuter reports.
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Jose Ayala Lasso arrives in Kigali after meeting
RPF commander Maj. Gen. Paul Kagame in Byumba, Rwanda.
May 12:

Reuter reports that aid workers say mass killings are still being conducted in areas
of the south controlled by the .. interim government."
In a letter to OFDA, RPF asks the U.S. government "to provide humanitarian assistance to
the displaced people in the areas under its control. ..

May 13:

UN reports at least 88 students were massacred yesterday in the town of
Gikongoro, held by the 11 interim government."
Reuter reports that the word "genocide~~ has been dropped from a draft Security Council

resolution and has been replaced with the phrase .. systematic, widespread and flagrant
violations of international humanitarian Jaw...
Belgian Foreign Minister Willy.Ciaes calls on the United States to "play a much more active
role" in Rwanda.
May 16:

The New York Times reports the United States .. forced the United Nations today to put
off plans to send 5,500 troops to Rwanda.. in favo~ of a Jess ambitious plan that would initially
insert only 850 UN troops, with up to 5,500 authonzed for later.
Time magazine quotes U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson as saying, "We have got
to hope that these people will understand that they are brothers!'

May 17:

UN Security Council Resolution 918 authorizes UNAMIR with troop strength of up to 5,500.
Initially, only an additional 500 Ghanaians and 175 military observers will be inserted, pending
Council approval of further study on future deployments requested of Boutros-Ghali. The
resolution expands UNAMIR's mandate to include the security and protection of civilians. AP
reports the Clinton Administration "reluctantly supported the resolution under pressure from
.
other Security Council members anxious to act"
UNHCR reports that, for the first time, it has received accusations of RPF involvement in
torture and massacres.

May 18:

RPF denies accusations by UNHCR officials in Tanzania that it has engaged in torture and
massacres.

May 19:

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings says the United States must provide logistical and
material support in the deployment of African troops, saying the United States "is the one
country with the resources and capability" to do so.

May 22:

RPF captures Kigali airport.

May 25:

In New York, Boutros-Ghali declares that he, the UN, and the international community as a
whole have failed in Rwanda. "It is genocide which has been committed in Rwanda and more
than 200,000 people have been killed [but] the international community is still discussing what
ought to be done," he says.
UN Human Rights Commission adopts resolution condemning massacres and saying it
believes .. genocidal acts may have occurred." Resolution also call on Boutros-Ghali to
appoint a Special Rapporteur to investigate and document human rights violations in
Rwanda.
According to the New York Times, the United States has indicated that it may lend 50
armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR.
Reuter reports Ethiopia and Senegal, joining Ghana, have agreed in writing to send some
800 troops each.
OFDA dispatches Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART) to region.

May 27:

AP reports tens of thousands of Rwandans, including soldiers of the Rwandan army, fleeing
south from Kigali.

May 31:

A Senegalese UNAMIR officer is killed in an RPF mortar attack, the second UNAMJR fatality
attributed to RPF forces.

June 1:

UNAMIR commander Dallaire appeals to the United States to send armored personnel
carriers and other military equipment to help evacuate trapped civilians. Reuter reports
Dallaire briefed an envoy from President Clinton in Nairobi on UNAMIR's needs and was
told his request nwould be taken to the highest authority...

June 2:

Reuter reports aid groups caution that na horde of Biblical proportions is swarming south to
flee advancing rebels, .. and that if those fleeing enter Zaire or Burundi .. aid workers will be
barely prepared to feed or shelter them ...

AP reports the United States will send 50 armored personnel carriers to UNAMIR.
June 6:

UNAMIR commander Dallaire reports that large numbers of Rwandans are expected to flee
the country in the near future, and says that two million is a "reasonable [planning] figure.'•
AP reports that African countries have so far volunteered 3,500 of the 4,000 infantry troops the
UN wants to send to Rwanda, but that engineering and communications staff are in short
supply.

June 8:

UN Security Council Resolution 925 endorses Boutros-GhaWs proposals for deploying the
remainder of UNAMIR•s authorized troops, and extends UNAMIR mandate until
December 9, 1994.
Government of Uganda reports that bodies are no longer entering Lake Victoria from the
Kagera River, and that fewer bodies are washing up on the river•s shores.
RPF soldiers kill13 Catholic clerics. Later, RPF official acknowledges that .. misguided.. RPF
soldiers are responsible. It is the first confirmed massacre by RPF forces.

June 9:

OXFAM official states, .. During the past months of slaughter, the United States has been the
key player in halting action on Rwanda, creating a series of excuses and inventing problems
that do not exist. ..

June 10:

The New York Times reports that the Clinton Administration has instructed its spokespersons
not to use the word .. genocide.. in describing the killings in Rwanda, but rather, to say .. acts of
genocide may have occurred.'• The Times reports the Administration is concerned that if it
acknowledges that genocide is occurring, it would be expected to take action to prevent it.
U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson says, .. As a responsible government, you don•t
just go around hollering •genocide.' You say that acts of genocide may have occurred and
they need to be investigated, .. according to the Times report.

UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Bacre Waly Ndiaye begins visit to
Rwanda.
June 11:

Secretary of State Warren Christopher, responding to criticism over the Administration•s
refusal to label the Rwanda massacres as "genocide, .. states, .. If there is any particular magic
in calling it genocide, I have no hesitancy in saying that. ..

June 13:

Uruguayan UNAMIR officer is killed in an RPF rocket-propelled grenade attack, the third
UNAMIR fatality attributed to RPF forces.

June 14:

Approximately 60 Tutsi boys are abducted from the Sainte Famille church complex and
murdered by Hutu militias.
In Tunisia, the RPF and Rwandan army reportedly agree to a cease-fire. The agreement
seems to have no effect on events in Rwanda.

June 15:

French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe indicates that France and its African allies are prepared
to intervene militarily in Rwanda if massacres continue.

June 16:

RPF spokesman James Rwengo, citing past French support for the Rwandan government,
says the French .. should not participate in any force, even a United Nations one, much less
carry out any action on their own ...
All members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee sign letter to President Clinton urging a
greater U.S. response to the genocide in Rwanda.

June 17:

Washington Post reports that Administration officials now state that the 1948 Genocide
Convention merely .. enables.. governments that detect genocide to act to stop it but does

not require them to do so.

'

Washington Post reports Administration officials reject criticism that the delivery of armored
vehicles to UNAMIR has taken too long, saying that the elapsed time from request to
delivery will be one month, less than normal in such transactions.

July 19:

Italian Defense Minister Cesare Previti says Italy will not take part in any French-led
intervention in Rwanda.

June 20:

Following the evacuation of hundreds of mostly Tutsi people from the surrounded Sainte
Famille compound in Kigali, UNAMIR spokesman Major Jean-Guy Plante states, "We can
only do what we can do. There are people in desperate situations all over Kigali, but we can
only rescue people when both sides let us, and we have only so many trucks." AP reports
nearly 2,000 people were left behind.
Boutros-Ghali urges Security Council to accept Fran_ce's offer of i~tervention and s_ays French
troops should stay in Rwanda for three months, until UNAMIR remforcements arnve.
Boutros-Ghali says some 4,600 troops have been offered by nine countries.
State Department spokesman Mike McCurry tells reporters the United States "is supportive
of their [French] efforts to muster international support for an early deployment of a UN force
that would help put an end to the atrocities in Rwanda.~~

June 21:

More than twenty French aid organizations speak out against the French plan to intervene
militarily in Rwanda.
Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes says, "Someone must take the initiative to save what is
left to save. France took the initiative and I don't know any other candidates."

June 22:

The UN Security Council, in a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions, approves Resolution 929
authorizing French military intervention in Rwanda. The resolution authorizes French troops to
use "all necessary means" to achieve the humanitarian objectives identified in Resolution 925,
namely, contributing to the security and protection of civilians and providing security and
support for the distribution of relief supplies. The French intervention is authorized for up to
two months.
Given RPF opposition to the French intervention, some 42 French-speaking UN military
observers from Togo, Congo, and Senegal are evacuated from Rwanda as a precautionary
move.
OFDA reports that, to date, 10,700 bodies have been retrieved from Lake Victoria and
buried.

June 23:

The first of 47 U.S. armored personnel carriers leased to the UN arrive in Entebbe, Uganda
from Germany.
First French troops cross into Rwanda on assessment missions from Zaire. Reuter reports
that Radio RTLM says the French are coming to fight on the side of the interim government
and are bringing in new weapons.

June 24:

AP reports that relief groups allege that arms are moving through Goma, Zaire into "interim
government"-held border areas of Rwanda.

June 27:

To date, more than 1,300 French troops have arrived in Goma and Bukavu, Zaire. A total of
2,500 are expected.

June 28:

UN Special Rapporteur issues report on Rwanda. Report characterizes massacres as
"genocide."
.
Reuter reports that UNESCO has offered $20,000 to help set up a humanitarian radio station
in Rwanda that would counter the broadcasts of Hutu extremists.
UNAMIR spokesman reports that only five U.S. M-113 armored personnel carriers have
arrived in Entebbe, Uganda.

July 1:

Security Council Resolution 935 requests establishment of Commission of Experts to analyze
evidence of grave violations of humanitarian law and possible acts of genocide in Rwanda.
OFDA DART field office to respond to crisis is established in Bujumbura, Burundi.

New York Times reporting on French troops providing protection to a small group of Tutsi
survivors in the s~uthwest, quotes one French noncof!Imissio~~d officer as saying, ~~~!sis not
what we were led to believe. We were told that Tutsa were killing Hutu, and now thts.
Another French soldier tells the Times, 11 1f we leave, they [the Tutsis] will be dead by tonight. II
Washington Post reports that French soldiers had believed Hutu statements that Tutsis in
the southwest were well-armed rebels. "We were manipulated, .. one French officer told the
Post. "[W]e have not a single wounded Hutu here, just massacred Tutsis, .. he said.
July4:

RPF forces take control of Kigali.

July 5:

French military authorities report that more than 2,300 French soldiers and marines and 300
Senegalese soldiers are in Zaire or western Rwanda and that France is considering setting
up a .. safe zone" in the southwest
RPF says that it intends to appoint Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu and member of moderate
MDR party, to head a new broad-based government.

July6:

Belgian Foreign Ministry spokesman says that Belgium is "completely ready to work with this
[new] government.''

July7:

Faustin Twagiramungu tells Reuters Television, "I appeal to the big powers, especially the
United States, to assume completely their responsibilities and send soldiers to Rwanda and
not say that Africans should do it alone.''

June 8:

The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reports that Rwanda needs more than one
million tons of food aid this year to avert large-scale famine.

July 12:

UNHCR reports as many as 500,000 Rwandan Hutus are moving toward the northwestern
town of Gisenyi on the border with Zaire, fleeing an RPF advance.
Speaking in a personal capacity, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, UN Special Rapporteur for Rwanda,
states, 11 lt seems to me quite difficult to admit that in this century you can have a massacre of
up to half a million people with everyone watching. I think it's a very, very sad event.''

July 13:

Ugandan officials report that 16,000 Rwandan refugees who had fled to Uganda in 1959 had
returned to Rwanda following the fall of Kigali to RPF forces.

July 14:

UNHCR reports that more than 100,000 Rwandan refugees have arrived in Goma, Zaire.
UN Rwanda Emergency Office spokesman says 800,000 more are expected within two days.
Officials report there are 1,500 tons of food in Goma, enough to feed 150,000 people for
one month.
Reuter quotes Rwandan soldier as saying, "The lnkontanyi [rebels] are taking positions
around Gisenyi and we believe they will start shelling it as soon as the civilians have emptied
the town. 11
Reuter reports mobile radio station still operating from somewhere near Gisenyi on border
with Zaire.
French Foreign Ministry spokesman says that remnants of the fleeing Rwandan "interim
governmenf' would not be welcome in the French zone in southwestern Rwanda.
Prime Minister-designate Faustin Twagiramungu returns to Kigali from exile in Belgium.

July 15:

Re.uter reports that extremist radio broadcasts are encouraging Rwandan Hutus to flee into
Zatre, and that truckloads of Rwandan soldiers are also entering Zaire. UN officials estimate
refugees are entering Zaire at a rate of 12,000 per hour.
Thirteen weeks after large-scale massacres began in Rwanda, President Ctinton orders the
closure of the Rwandan embassy in Washington, DC. In a statement, President Clinton says,
"The United States cannot allow representatives of a regime that supports genocidal
massacres to remain on our soil.''

French officials say that French forces in Rwanda will detain members of the "interim
government'' if they are found in the French zone.
July 16:

Tutsi refugees in Zaire who haa fled the massacres in Rwanda report that grenades are
thrown over the barbed wire surrounding their compound. The refugees believe Hutu
extremists carried out the attack.

July 17:

Journalists report that two mortar shells fall on the Zairean side of the border near Goma,
killing several people. Scores of refugees are trampled to death as they flee from Gisenyi
to Goma.

July 18:

The International Committee of the Red Cross reports that up to 100,000 Rwandans have
left the French zone and entered Zaire in the past 24 hours. Reuter reports that an
additional 50,000 Rwandans have fled to Burundi, bringing the total there to 140,000.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAJD) Administrator J. Brian Atwood arrives in
Goma, Zaire and says the United States is pledging an additional $31 million in aid.
UNHCR reports a surge of refugee arrivals in Zaire following radio broadcasts that state
"[the RPF] are going to come kill you." Reportedly, refugees are moving toward Uvira,
Zaire.

July 19:

Pasteur Bizimungu, a Hutu and formerly the RPF representative in Brussels, is sworn in as
President of Rwanda.
Rwanda's Ambassador to the UN decides not to participate in the Security Council.
French forces distribute leaflets urging people to stay in Rwanda and promising food
supplies.
UNHCR reports that radio broadcasts are continuing. A spokesman for the French aid
organization AICF says the radio "has prompted general hysteria among people who
believe only in their leaders, who have made devils of the Rwanda Patriotic Front. People
are scared out of their wits."
USAID Administrator Atwood says, "The Rwandan military is everywhere Un Goma,
Zaire] .... They are planning to invade the country."

July 20:

Rwandan soldiers and civilians loot 200 tons of food and medicine from a Swedish aid station
in the town of Cyangugu near the border with Zaire.
The first suspected case of cholera is reported in refugee camps near Goma.

July 22:

United States announces that it will employ its military to step up the provision of
humanitarian and logistical aid to the relief effort. The United States will upgrade the airport in
Goma, Zaire, manage an "airhead" in Entebbe, Uganda that will become the focal point of
the relief effort, and provide food, medical, and other relief aid.

